This paper studies revenue-maximizing allocation mechanisms for multiple goods where the buyer's utility can depend non-linearly in his type. We point out that despite strictly increasing virtual utilities, the allocation rule obtained via pointwise optimization may fail to be increasing and thus it may violate incentive compatibility. More importantly, the revenue maximizing allocation may involve randomizations between di¤erent allocations. Keywords: mechanism design, optimal auctions, bunching. JEL Classi…cation Codes: C72, D44, D82.
The fact that randomizations are a feature of revenue-maximizing mechanisms can be viewed as quite surprising given that the buyer is risk neutral and his type is single dimensional. In the continuum varieties model of Maskin and Riley (1989) these authors devote Section 5 to illustrate why randomizations are not a feature of revenue-maximizing auctions. Also Thanassoulis (2004) stresses that the randomizations in his environment are due to the fact that types are multidimensional. Why then do they appear in our environment? The reason is that we are considering a …nite number of di¤erent products, and we allow for utilities to be non-linear in types. The feature of randomization is absent in the extreme cases of one, and a continuum of identical goods, but it can appear in intermediate cases where there is some discreteness in the number of goods and goods are heterogeneous.
Example
Suppose that there is a single buyer whose type, v; is distributed uniformly on the interval [0; 1] and that there are two possible allocations, z 1 and z 2 : The buyer's payo¤s from these two allocations are given by u z 1 (v) = 0:5e v + 0:524 and u z 2 (v) = e 0:5v ; which are both convex and increasing in v. We let Z = fz 1 ; z 2 g: Our objective is to …nd the allocation mechanism that maximizes the seller's revenue. As usual, we can appeal to the revelation principle and search among the direct revelation mechanisms (DRM ) that satisfy truth-telling and voluntary participation. A DRM here consists of an assignment rule and a payment rule (p; x). For all v p(v) = (p z 1 (v); p z 2 (v)) speci…es the probability with which each allocation prevails and x(v) is the expected payment incurred by the buyer.
Given a DRM (p; x) the buyer's maximized payo¤ is given by
and it is convex, since it is a maximum of convex functions. A DRM (p; x) is feasible if it satis…es (i) resource constraints, (ii) incentive compatibility constraints and (iii) voluntary participation. 2 Resource constraints require that, for all v; we have that 0 p z (v) 1 and z2Z p z (v) = 1. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for incentive compatibility are that (a) the derivative of U (more precisely a selection from its subgradient, which is single valued almost surely) evaluated at the true type, that is
dv ; is weakly increasing, and (b) U (v) = U (0) + Below we use the following notation P z i (v)
We denote by J z (v) the virtual utility of allocation z. 3 For this example, virtual utilities are given by The graphs of J z 1 and J z 2 cross at two points v = 0:1054 andv = 0:6346: By using standard arguments, we can write the seller's problem as:
subject to : P (v) increasing and How should the seller proceed? At a solution the seller should mix between z 1 and z 2 in a way that minimizes the "cost"of having to choose with positive probability an allocation that does not have the highest virtual utility, subject to respecting the requirement that P is increasing in v.
The region of "compromise"is an interval of the form [x; x]; where x and x satisfy 0 x v x v; wherev is the …rst point to the right of v where J z 1 and J z 2 cross again. 4 The loss of assigning positive weight to allocation
dv and the loss of assigning positive weight to allocation
An optimal mechanism must randomize between z 1 and z 2 on [x; x]; in a way such that the loss is minimized. Moreover x and x must be chosen optimally.
The problem to be solved is called Program A and it is given by: 5
subject to:
(ii) if x > 0; then p z 1 (x) = 1 (and P (x) = P z 1 (x)) and if x <v then p z 2 ( x) = 1 (and
4 Such a point exists, since Jz i (1) = u z i (1), and we have that
. This last situation is not possible, since then we would not have had the …rst crossing. 5 Since for each v it must be that p
The constraints (i) and (ii) guarantee that P is increasing and thus the solution is incentive compatible. Constraints in (ii) arise because outside the region of "compromise"[x; x] the best for the seller is to assign probability one to z 1 for v 2 [0; x] and probability one to allocation z 2 for v 2 [ x;v]:
Now we establish that Program A is equivalent to a much simpler problem where the only choice variable is x: This is done with the help of a couple of results.
Our …rst result states that an optimal assignment rule randomizes between allocation z 1 and allocation z 2 in such a way, that P remains constant over [x; x]: Its proof is straightforward and we omit it. The interested reader is referred to the working paper version of this work.
Lemma 1 An optimal assignment rule randomizes between allocations z 1 and z 2 over an interval [x; x]; with 0 x x v; in a way such that
The intuition for this result is simple. Optimality dictates that P is as small as possible to the right of v ; where z 2 is preferred by the seller, and P is as large as possible to the left of v ; where the seller prefers z 1 : Since P must be increasing these two forces imply that for the interval where the seller is mixing P must be ‡at. Put in another way, since the monotonicity constraint is binding, optimality dictates that it is satis…ed with "equality", so P is ‡at and not strictly increasing.
Next, observe that x can be pinned down by x and p z 1 : It is either the smallest v where p z 1 (v) = 0; or if such a v does not exist, it is equal to 1: That is
Our next result shows that at an optimum if x > 0, then the seller assigns probability one to z 1 at x; whereas if x = 0; then she assigns probability one to z 2 .
Lemma 2 If at an optimum x > 0; then p z 1 (x) = 1, whereas, if at an optimum x = 0, then p z 1 (x) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix. If x > 0, Lemma 2 implies that p z 1 (x) = 1 and with the help of (4) we get
6 Recall that if x <v then p z 2 ( x) = 1. Now, if x = 0, Lemma 2 tells us that p z 1 (0) = 0; which is equivalent to p z 2 (0) = 1; which immediately implies that 0 = x = x; and therefore
From (6) and (7) one can see that Program A can be stated as a problem where the control variable is simply x. We call this problem Program B:
where x(x) satis…es (5) and p z 1 (x) satis…es either (6) or (7). If a solution of Program B is interior, that is, if x > 0; then, an optimal allocation rule is given by
otherwise, that is, if x = 0; then p is p 
which with the help of (5) and (6) implies p z 1 (v) = e 0:5v e 0:074 e 0:5v e v and x = 0:148:
Substituting (10) and (11) in (9) we get that an optimal assignment rule is which is incentive compatible by construction. Figure 4 depicts the probability of z 1 that p assigns around the region of randomization. In this example the optimal assignment rule involves randomizations. This is in contrast to the classical case, where (excluding cases where the seller is indi¤erent) an optimal allocation rule is deterministic.
In general, when there are more allocations, and/or when virtual utilities cross many times, and/or when P z0 s are not always ranked in the same way, the details of the solution depend on the particular speci…cs of the problem at hand. However, the main idea of how to proceed is the one we illustrated. Whenever there is a point where IC is violated by the assignment rule obtained via pointwise optimization, a solution involves an interval of randomization between more than one allocations. Of course, it is possible that in some cases this interval is degenerate.
